DDASaccident562 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
8-23-2007
DDASaccident562
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident562" (2007). Global CWD Repository. 761.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/761
DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/02/2008 Accident number: 562 
Accident time: 10:26 Accident Date: 23/08/2007 
Where it occurred: Task No: 6-015, DA 
CBU No. 585, Near 
Najdh 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 25/08/2007 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMAS 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: DPICM M77 
submunition 




Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/02/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: UTM: 
725,380.3689205 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 




Limited details of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files 
and pictures. Their conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has 
been lost. The substance of the available date is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The 
original files are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. This record will be amended if a full 
accident report is made available later. 
 
Internal accident data 
[This data is gathered from a detailed Annex to the Internal Accident report. Unfortuantely the 
accident report has not yet been made available.] 
Tasking order 
Date: 14th May 2007 
To: [Name removed] TOM [International demining NGO] 
From: [Name removed] Chief of Plans, MACC SL 
CC: [Name removed] Chief of Operations, MACC SL; [Name removed] LAF Ops Officer 
Subject: Parameters for Cluster Strike Survey in Area 6 
Location: Area-6 
Requirement: (Will be amended as required) 
It has been recognised that a Survey requirement (Team) is needed to facilitate a more rapid 
review and on the ground analysis of the actual contamination within the specified Cluster 
strikes in Area 6. 
The Survey team will be directed to identify the centre of the strike where possible, fence the 
immediate area and take the UTM and distance for bearing. These areas need only at this 
stage require box of four (4) it will also be necessary to also take photos of the area of 
concern. 
Once these are done on each target area, it will allow subsequent BAC teams to be deployed 
directly into the threat area making the clearance more efficient and effective. 
Documentation 
[International demining NGO] have documentation that will fulfil the requirement for the survey 
process, these will be filled in by the Survey Supervisor and presented to the [International 
demining NGO] TOM for review and then passed on to the Chief of Plans MACC SL. 
Both digital and hardcopy is required, these will be entered into IMSMA as additional 
information. 
On a weekly (Friday) basis the [International demining NGO] TOM will receive documentation 
ie: 
Spreadsheet 
IMSMA maps both imagery and UNIFIL 
DA reports as needed and  
LAF Reports (New targets) these were previously visited by [Other demining groups] EOD 
teams, I will attach also their findings. 
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Recommendations that current IMSMA and GIS issued to your organisation be utilised to 
further enhance information requirements. 
Cancellations 
If any task is deemed that no threat exists or the actual damage was caused by other means, 
then the Cancellation Process is to be used, as per the NTSG. These are to be filled in by the 
CLO and submitted to the [International demining NGO] TOM for review and passed to the 
Chief of Plans MACC SL. 
Cluster Clearance 
No clearance of cluster bombs is to take place unless they constitute an immediate threat to 
the community. 
If cluster bombs are required to be removed/destroyed then a detailed search of the area is to 
be conducted and records kept detailing the type of munition, the quantity cleared, their 
location (by UTM). 
Only qualified EOD personnel are required to destroy these items, if [International demining 
NGO] cannot destroy these items the MACC SL Chief of Plans will deploy a qualified EOD 
team if required. 
Demolitions 
All activities that involve any demolitions is to be per SOP and that these demolitions are to 
be reported to the MACC SL radio room at least 30mins prior to any action taken. 
Any changes to these requirements are to be approved by the UNMACC SL before 
implementation. 
Signed: Chief of Plans UNMACC SL; LAF Ops Officer, MACC SL/NDO 
Accepted by organisation: TOM [International demining NGO].  
 
From Annex A  
[the only part of the report made available] 
Task No: 6-015, RECCE 1: DA CBU No. 585 
GR: 725,380.3689205 
Start date 22/08/07 
Nearest hospital: Najdh, 20km and 25 minutes away. 
Clearance methodology: Technical Survey 
BAC Team: RECCE 1 
Last casevac exercise: 22-8-07 
Date of last external QA: 22-9-07 
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Time of accident: 10:26 
Location of accident: CBU 585 
GR: 725380,3689205 
Time of evacuation: 10:35 
[Approx CASEVAC time: 34 minutes] 
From photo story 
[The victim was handling a device when the accident occurred. Another “gagged” device was 
close by.] 
 
[The M77 partially detonated in the Victim’s hand, but the main charge did not explode. The 
picture below shows the device afterwards, with the firing pin and ribbon separated.] 
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[The copper cone of the shaped charge inside the M77 was visible at one end, and the high 
explosive fill at the other.] 
 
[The Victim’s right hand was injured.] 
 
[Pictures of the site and the prodding tools showed that clearance was being conducted, but 
there was no indication of any detectors that would have allowed sub-surface clearance.] 
 
[Pictures of another disarmed M77 showed that this was not a non-intrusive survey. Technical 
Survey is usually intrusive, but the tasking order form the MAC into the order that “No” 
clearance be conducted - and this was stressed in Bold.] 
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[Pictures of the Victim’s PPE showed an undamaged visor and a short frag-jacket with blood 
stains.] 




Victim number: 735 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 34 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Long vior 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Hand 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The instructions from the MACC SL were ambiguous and open to interpretation. The 
instructions stressed that “NO” clearance was to be conducted, but the task was Technical 
Survey, which generally involves making investigative lanes into a suspect area. This appears 
to have been done visually. 
It is possible to see whether an exposed M77 has armed, and it is routine for many demining 
groups to “gag” unarmed items so that they cannot “arm”, and then destroy them later.  
The M77 involved in this accident did not detonate properly and may have been damaged. If 
this was visible, it would imply that the Victim made an error by touching it. But if the damage 
was not visible, the Victim was just extremely lucky. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the Victim 
may have been operating as instructed and the accident occurred due to a device that was 
damaged and unstable, but not obviously so.  
The secondary cause is listed as a “Field Control inadequacy” because the Victim may have 
been exceeding his brief by the removal of multiple items that did not present an immediate 
risk to civilians. The removal of some easy to locate devices is sometimes called “cherry-
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picking” and frowned upon because there is often a “footprint” from a cluster munition strike – 
and the removal of devices can erase the footprint and mean that a far wider area has to be 
cleared later.   
The failure of the demining group’s investigators to wear PPE at the site is common, but sets 
a bad example. 
This record will be updated if more information becomes available later. 
 
7 
